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# The Legislative Initiative of the Parliamentary Opposition in the Moroccan Constitutional System: A Reading Of Constitutional Practice in Light of Comparative Experiences

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## Abstract

*In line with more advanced constitutional democracies, the Moroccan Constitution of 2011 granted broader powers to Parliament, particularly the House of Representatives. At the same time, it ensured the rights of the opposition, granting it multiple legal powers and privileges that go beyond the constraints of representative democracy based on proportional representation, allowing it to acquire constitutional powers between the majority and the opposition. The latter was granted a special status that qualifies it to participate in parliamentary decision-making. The opposition participates in the legislative function as a fundamental pillar of the legislative institution, as stipulated in the Constitution, particularly by including proposed laws on the agenda of both houses of Parliament. At least one day per month is allocated to reviewing draft laws, including those submitted by the opposition. However, the most prominent position of the parliamentary opposition in the House of Representatives remains its chairmanship of the Justice, Legislation and Human Rights Committee, in addition to its chairmanship of another permanent committee not stipulated in the House of Representatives' internal regulations, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Chapter 10 and the third paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution. However, despite the importance of these provisions, a number of researchers believe that this does not guarantee the opposition an influential position in the legislative process.*

**Keywords:** Parliament, Parliamentary Opposition, Parliamentary Majority, Legislative Initiative, Parliamentary Minority.

## Introduction

If political and constitutional literature considers the existence of parliamentary opposition as one of the indicators of democratic practice, and that this latter has the traditional role of legislation within political systems based on the foundations of liberal philosophy and the principle of separation of powers, then the question arises about the limits of this legislative function carried out by the parliamentary opposition, and its relationship with the executive body and the parliamentary majority.

To analyze the elements of this topic, it will be divided into two parts:

Firstly: The parliamentary minority as a legislative actor: A critical comparative study in light of the 2011 Constitution

Secondly: Legislation of the parliamentary minority between constitutional provisions and practical constraints.

## **First: The parliamentary minority as a legislative actor: A critical comparative study in light of the 2011 Constitution**

The constitutional legislator has worked to alleviate the obstacles of the logic of proportional representation based on numerical approaches in acquiring powers by enabling the parliamentary minority with constitutional competencies to ensure its actual participation in advancing legislative initiatives. Article 10 of the 2011 Constitution stipulates the right of opposition to participate actively in the legislative process, especially through the registration of law proposals on the agenda of both houses of parliament. The constitutional legislator has also ensured the participation of the opposition in the work of parliamentary committees by allocating the presidency of the legislative committee to the opposition (Article 69), which confirms that the legislative domain is not exclusive to the government, but rather a field shared by various actors, both government and opposition.

The involvement of parliamentary opposition in the legislative process is viewed through comparative experiences as one of the components of the democratic nature of the legislative process, knowing that the government's perspective on legislation may not be free from imbalances due to the dominance of a technical view of laws at the expense of a social approach. Therefore, several institutional mechanisms have been relied upon to enhance the legislative initiative of the opposition and to limit the dominance of the executive authority over legislative initiatives. Some comparative constitutions stipulate allowing the parliamentary minority to propose delays in the approval of legislations, pending further review and scrutiny. This is an important mechanism that enables the opposition to confront the swift passage of legislation by the majority, allowing them the opportunity to scrutinize it, especially when it comes to some controversial laws, which we will attempt to analyze in the following two paragraphs.

### **1. Involvement of the opposition in the legislative process: An approach to overcome the flaws of representative democracy**

The constitutional legislator worked to empower the parliamentary minority with constitutional authorities to ensure their actual participation in advancing the legislative initiative, in order to alleviate the obstacles of the proportional representation logic based on a numerical approach to acquiring powers (Ben Hayba, 2021, p. 87).

And freeing the parliamentary minority from the pressure of the outputs of representative democracy, which only provides it with a modest margin of capabilities and guarantees to influence the parliamentary decision-making process (bin Hayba, 2021, p. 90)

So what does the legislative initiative of the parliamentary minority mean?

Some researchers consider that the legislative initiative is that "the work that lays the initial foundations for legislation and defines its content and subject matter," while others have defined it as "the right to submit a text related to a budget law or a regulation for discussion and voting by the parliament." It is inconceivable to establish any law of this kind without going through this step, which requires effort and competence in order to present a clear and technical project or proposal for a law (Nasiri, 2022, p. 394).

The British experience serves as a long-standing model in establishing what we can call the history of customs, traditions, and parliamentary practices, which are based on concentrating power in the hands of the Prime Minister supported by a parliamentary majority, while preserving the right of the opposition and committing to the rules of political rotation under the supervision of the electoral body. Regarding the Moroccan political and constitutional system, it is one of the systems experiencing a gradual process of democratic openness; yet it still faces challenges in the democratic transition. Therefore, the Moroccan parliament, with its troubled experiences, has seemingly contributed to reinforcing the Moroccan constitutional life, forming a framework for the struggle among the political elite, and providing a wide space for political expression and position taking, although its relationship with the executive authority at various levels remains complex.

Its components are not balanced, as the repeated royal direction for legislative work, the mosaic understanding of the parliamentary majority, the lack of professionalism in parliamentary work, the modest level of political culture among parliament members, and the government's dominance over the legislative process and control over the parliamentary institution's agenda (Fountir, 2002, p.86).

All these factors have contributed to varying degrees to shaping the image of the parliamentary opposition, the level of its performance, and the limits of its functions and roles within the parliamentary institution (Fountir, 2002, p. 90).

The involvement of the parliamentary opposition in the legislative process is required by the principles of democracy, by granting it the right to legislative initiative in proposing and discussing laws within the specialized committees and during the sessions of parliament, as well as the right to propose amendments engage in discussions, and vote. Article 10 of the 2011 Constitution stipulates the right of the opposition to participate effectively in the legislative process, especially by registering legislative proposals on the agenda of both houses of Parliament. The right to propose refers to the action that lays the groundwork for legislation and defines its content, which means granting the parliamentary minority a preferential right and the opportunity to propose laws that parliament is required to study.

It has also been stated in section 60 of the second paragraph that "the opposition is a fundamental component of the two councils and participates in the functions of legislation and monitoring," which confirms that the legislative domain is not exclusive to the government, but rather a domain shared by various actors, "government and opposition." (Bakshwa, 2019, p 241 – 242).

In addition to these requirements, Article 82 of the Constitution stipulates the allocation of at least one day a month to study proposed laws, including those submitted by the opposition. According to researcher Jalal Al-Saeed, this provision is meant to put an end to the marginalization of the legislative work of the opposition within Parliament, noting that it urges the government to consider the proposed laws and amendments submitted by both houses of Parliament (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2013,p.2).

According to one researcher, the provisions contained in Article 82 seem to have come to reinforce and operationalize what was mentioned in general in Chapter Ten, particularly concerning the right related to 'actual participation in the legislative process, especially through the registration of proposed laws on the agenda of both houses of parliament, so that the opposition's participation in the legislative process does not remain confined to the registration of proposed laws on the agenda (Amrida, 2014, p.167).

The constitutional legislator has been keen to ensure the participation of the opposition in the work of parliamentary committees by assigning the presidency of the legislative committee to the opposition (Article 69), which gives it a prominent position in the field of legislation. Article 70 of the internal regulations of the House of Representatives states that the council shall allocate the presidency of at least two committees to the opposition, one of which must be the legislative committee. Furthermore, priority is given to the opposition to head the Public Finance Oversight Committee if they submit their nomination, a measure that can safeguard its work from the dominance of majority trends, which may contribute to achieving a certain balance, (Bin Haybah, 2021, p. 94-95) , This constitutes a guarantee and legal protection for the minority to exercise its powers, knowing that it has suffered from marginalization in the legislative process due to the dominance of government projects and the parliamentary majority, which weakened the performance of the parliamentary minority and limited its chances of passing proposed laws and registering them on the council's agenda for discussion (Bakswa,2019, p. 243), Although the role of the committee chair is neutral, as it involves coordinating between the committee and the government .

The right to amend also represents a form of initiative granted to members of the parliamentary opposition to contribute to enriching the discussion and to express their perceptions and opinions on

various policies and financial issues prepared and proposed by the government, whether in permanent committees or in general sessions. The right to amend is at the core of legislative proposals and is the main channel through which the government and parliament interact, as described by Professor Jean Pierre Cambay. Based on this, the power of amendment remains an essential tool at the disposal of the opposition, rooted in Article 83 of the Constitution, which states in its first paragraph that: "Members of both houses of Parliament and the government have the right to amend." (Al-Hassaka, 2017, p. 149), This helps members and advisors of the parliamentary opposition to compensate for the shortcomings in their initiatives through legislative proposals (Al-Hasaka, 2017, p. 149).

Involving the parliamentary opposition in the legislative process is likely to positively impact legislative decisions and enhance the democracy of the legislative process. The government's perspective on legislation may be flawed due to an overemphasis on the technical view of laws at the expense of a social approach. Therefore, taking into account the views of the parliamentary opposition would significantly contribute to strengthening legislative decision-making (Al-Zayani, 2012, p. 69).

Despite the government's dominance over the development of most legislative proposals, the parliamentary opposition can still play an indirect role by positioning itself as an active competitor and drawing public attention to the government's contradictions and the undesirable consequences of the proposed legislation. This could lead to negative publicity that may harm the government in the upcoming elections, possibly prompting the government to reshape its proposals more comprehensively. Proposals from the parliamentary opposition to mitigate the severity of the criticisms directed at them before officially presenting any draft law (Al-Zayani, 2012, p. 68).

## **2. Institutional mechanisms to enhance the legislative initiative of the opposition in comparative experiences**

In order to limit the dominance of the executive authority over the legislative initiative, several constitutions have stipulated allowing the parliamentary minority to submit proposals to delay the ratification of legislation pending further review and scrutiny. In Sweden, for example, legislation affecting fundamental rights can be delayed for one year, with the agreement of at least 10 (out of 349) members of parliament, and this delay can be overturned by a vote of five-sixths (83%) of the members. In fact, any party or coalition of parties holding one-sixth of the seats can impose a postponement. Even if the opposition cannot ultimately prevent the passage of such laws, knowing that the majority vote is crucial, delaying legislation presents an opportune moment for the opposition to initiate parliamentary and media discussions about these bills. This may prompt the government to amend its proposals in advance to address any specific objections or concerns that the opposition may have and attempt to build consensus before legislating, instead of rushing to pass it, which means facing resistance from the opposition.

And if the mechanism for delaying legislation in Sweden is limited to legislation that can affect fundamental rights, in Denmark, five seats in the legislative authority can delay any bill - except for finance laws, naturalization laws, and emergency laws - for 12 days, which is a much less effective mechanism, yet it still...

The majority prevents the expedited passage of legislation without giving the opposition the opportunity to scrutinize it, especially when it comes to some controversial laws that might have been able to evade general scrutiny if it weren't for the establishment of this mechanism (Bulmer, 2021, p 35-36).

Studies indicate that the more the opposition participates in negotiating the content of legislation, the more it engages in the functions of governance instead of merely criticizing government policies and developing alternatives according to the classical concept of "Westminster", where the opposition is viewed as an alternative executive authority that shares with the ruling party a primary interest in

achieving and exercising executive power, without having the capacity to confront and thwart governmental majority tyranny in the legislative council (Stone, 2014, p 24).

In the same context, the Venice Commission considers the rights of the opposition to propose laws, as well as their right to representation and participation, their rights to speak and vote, and protection from mistreatment, as a criteria for assessing the democratic maturity of any political system. It is true that the principle of majority rule reflects the will of the popular majority and is a fundamental official and formal criterion of 'democracy, but it is also necessary to ensure the activation of the opposition's role, by enabling it to perform its functions within the legislative institution: providing political alternatives for their constituents, improving the parliamentary decision-making process by ensuring discussion, thought, and dissent and scrutinizing legislative proposals related to the government budget... In this regard, it is considered that measuring the extent to which it is permitted for the opposition in a particular parliamentary system to perform these functions is a sign of the level of democratic maturity; however, if none of them is achieved, that is a sign of a flawed democracy (European commission for democracy through law, 2010).

The conclusions of the Venice Commission intersect with the recommendations of the parliamentary seminar on the relations between the majority and minority parties in African parliaments, as it also called for ensuring that all members of parliament equally have the right to propose laws or amendments, regardless of their position within the parliamentary majority or minority (Guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in parliament, 1999, p 3).

Based on the above, one can point to the experience of the American Congress, where it is able, in each legislative session, to produce more than ten thousand proposed laws. This vast quantity is due to the supremacy of the theory of equality among the members of both houses of Congress in the right to propose laws, regardless of their affiliation with the majority or opposition. However, the American Constitution, despite adopting the principle of separation of powers and granting all legislative powers to Parliament, did not include an explicit provision granting Congress the authority to propose laws. Nevertheless, it has been agreed that the principle of separation of powers is the constitutional basis for the authority of Congress members to propose laws (Dahesh, 2017, p. 245).

Regarding the bills related to collecting or increasing state revenues, the proposal falls under the jurisdiction of the members of the House of Representatives. The Senate has the right to propose amendments to bills of a financial nature, which means that the U.S. Constitution has granted a constitutional preference to the House of Representatives at the expense of The Senate has the power to propose financial legislation, while it also ensures that both councils have the same right to propose legislation that is not financial (Dahesh, 2017, p. 246).

Although the constitutional right to propose bills is purely a matter for the legislative council, the reality is that legislative initiative is in the hands of the executive authority. It is true that from a formal constitutional perspective, only members of Congress can propose bills, yet they often act as intermediaries for the administration, presenting its proposals. Often, the suggestions made by a member of Congress are based on the desires of executive or administrative agencies, or a political party, or a lobbying group, or even some ordinary citizens from their district or elsewhere, because a senator or representative is the only one capable of introducing a bill, and the U.S. Constitution does not stipulate a specific number of members for the right to propose (Dahesh, 2017, p. 248).

### **Secondly: The Legislation of the Parliamentary Minority between Constitutional Provisions and Practical Constraints**

Despite the significance of the provisions stipulated in the 2011 Constitution to ensure the participation of the parliamentary minority in the legislative process, it is noted that the government's dominance over legislative initiatives continues to persist. The government holds the right to reject any proposal from Parliament (majority/minority) if its acceptance would lead to a reduction in public resources regarding financial law, or to the introduction of a public charge, or an increase in an

existing charge. In addition to this, Article 77 of the Constitution grants the government a central role in rejecting amendments proposed by members of the legislative institution based on the grounds of incompatibility, as well as opposing the discussion of any amendment that has not been previously presented. The specialized committee within the parliament, and the government's control over setting the parliament's agenda, is what we will attempt to analyze first. We will then address the issue of the limitations of legislative action and the imbalance in sectors in the absence of a unified strategy guiding the legislative work of the parliamentary opposition during the tenth legislative term.

### **1. The government's dominance over the legislative initiative and the decline of the parliamentary minority's role**

Many researchers note the continued dominance of the government over the legislative initiative, against the backdrop of a decline in the parliamentary minority's role, especially in areas of a financial nature, being the body responsible and constitutionally authorized to uphold respect for the principles of financial legitimacy. The government also controls various aspects of financial policies, based on the provisions of Article 77 and Article 79 of the constitution, which reinforces the dominance of the executive authority over the Legislative initiative at the expense of the original legislator (the parliament), effectively making it a secondary legislator (Al-Hasakah, 2017, p. 150)

The government also has the right to reject any proposal from the parliament (majority/minority) or amendments in the financial field if accepting them would result in a reduction of public resources for the financial law, or in the creation of a public charge, or an increase in an existing charge. The constitutional legislator has worked to ease the strictness of the government's approach to parliamentary legislative initiatives by requiring it to state the reasons for the rejections mentioned in Article 77 of the 2011 Constitution. The organic law 065.13 concerning the organization and management of government work and the legal status of its members obliges the government to allocate meetings to study the proposed laws submitted by members of parliament from both the majority and the minority and to define the government's position at least once a month.

In addition to the provisions of Article 77 of the Constitution, which give the government a central role in rejecting amendments proposed by members of the legislative institution based on the defect of being inappropriate, it has the right, according to the provisions of Article 83 of the Constitution, to oppose the discussion of any amendment that has not been previously presented to the competent committee within Parliament (Al-Hasakah, 2017, p. 150)

The government also intervenes in organizing the proceedings of the parliament by setting its agenda according to the order and priority it establishes, as indicated in Article 82/1 of the constitution: The office of each of the two houses of parliament sets its agenda, which means restricting the legislative initiative of the parliamentary minority (Nasiri, 2022, p. 396).

In addition to that, the government benefits at the level of committees from special privileges, as it can always rely on its majority present in all permanent committees to adopt the legislative projects and amendments it desires, and to reject any legal proposal or amendment put forward by the opposition, alongside the government's investment in its constitutional techniques to restrict the freedom of parliamentarians and reject any amendments it believes may affect the coherent and cohesive nature of its legal texts. Some may see that the parliamentary minority has the right to initiate a legal proposal or amend it, but the truth is that the final word belongs to the majority, which leads to the collapse of this right, especially since the government often monopolizes the legislative initiative concerning financial matters (Al-Tabtabai, 1985, p. 195). Due to the influence of the Moroccan legislator by the logic of parliamentary rationalization that takes into account the legacy of the constitutional system of France in the Fifth Republic.

The limitations of the opposition's role are not confined to legal and practical obstacles, but also extend to political restrictions due to the dominance of the parliamentary majority that supports the government.

This result from the adoption of the principle of proportional representation of factions in appointing members of permanent committees, which leads to the marginalization of their role. It is impossible to pass a draft law or an amendment without the government's approval, as the latter can resort to various constitutional mechanisms and powers it possesses (Al-Zayani ,2012, p. 183).

Or resort to unofficial channels that often occur behind the scenes, varying between coercion, pressure, and bargaining. This situation puts them in a position of power, enabling them to undermine the legislative initiative of the parliamentary minority (Al-Zayani, 2012, p.215).

Although the parliamentary minority sometimes succeeds in drawing the government's attention to certain topics in order to push it to present draft laws in specific areas, these proposals often only involve partial amendments to one or more articles of legislative texts. Additionally the quantitative and qualitative weaknesses of these proposals are evident as they are limited to areas of secondary importance (Boutaher, 2017, p. 64).

The opposition's limited role is not confined to legal and practical obstacles, but extends to political restrictions due to the dominance of the parliamentary majority that supports the government. This is a result of the principle of proportional representation of parties for the appointment of members of standing committees, which marginalizes their role. It is impossible to pass a bill or amendment without the government's approval, as the latter can resort to various constitutional mechanisms and powers at its disposal, or resort to informal channels that often take place behind the scenes, ranging from coercion and pressure to bargaining. This puts it in a position of power, enabling it to abort the legislative initiative of the parliamentary minority (Al-Zayani, 2012, p. 215).

Although the parliamentary minority has sometimes succeeded in drawing the government's attention to certain issues with the aim of prompting it to introduce bills in specific areas, these proposals are often limited to minor amendments to one or more articles of legislation. Furthermore, such proposals are weak in terms of both quantity and quality, and are restricted to areas of secondary importance (Boutahar, 2017, p 64).

## **2. Limited legislative action by the opposition: sectoral imbalance and lack of a unified strategy**

The results of the tenth parliamentary term show that 335 legislative texts were approved, with the parliamentary opposition submitting 105 proposals, representing an estimated 34.31 percent, which is a low percentage and confirms the executive branch's dominance over legislative initiative (Nassar,2025,p. 215).

What can be noted from the proposals put forward by the parliamentary opposition during the tenth legislative term is an imbalance between the various sectors, with the opposition focusing on legislation, justice and human rights (25 proposals), the interior, local communities, housing and urban policy (22 proposals), while sectors of considerable importance in the areas of legislation and oversight, particularly the economy, finance, social affairs and production, were neglected. This reveals the opposition's lack of a clear strategy in the area of legislation, not to mention the lack of coordination and fragmentation of the opposition's efforts, and the emergence of a desire to reach consensus with the majority, either by voting on government bills or by submitting joint proposals, which numbered 26 during the tenth legislative term, behavior that was dictated by clear political motives and interests (Nassar,2025 ,p. 221).The matter becomes even more complicated when it comes to political parties that are accustomed to government work. And joining the opposition is a last-minute choice made reluctantly or as a form of exile after the prospect of belonging to the government coalition has been blocked. This leads us to question the real function of the parliamentary opposition within the Moroccan political system, which is turning into an inevitable opposition (Akhouch, 2016, p.61-66).

Members of the parliamentary minority demonstrated their weak commitment to performing their legislative duties, as the number of bills proposed by the opposition during the tenth legislative term

(150 proposals) was low compared to their number (The opposition in the tenth state comprised 160 members of the House of Representatives and 59 members of the House of Councillors, if we count the seats of pro-government or loyalist trade unions).

On the other hand, the tenth legislative term revealed the government's approach and continued behavior, which effectively transformed parliament into a mere formal institution. It should be noted that the opposition, in its voting behavior, does not show any resistance to the government's legislative initiatives. Despite heated debates that sometimes reach the point of accusing the government, in the end, votes are unanimous (Al-Zayani, 2008, p. 276 ), however, what the majority overlooks is that these practices do not serve the parliamentary institution, but rather contribute to exacerbating its inability and paralysis to carry out its assigned tasks, namely legislation and oversight. Since parliament consists of a majority and a minority, it cannot function properly in the absence of either party. This requires a degree of cooperation, partnership and rapprochement between the parliamentary majority and minority in order to improve the performance of the parliamentary institution and enable it to carry out its assigned roles (Akhnouch, A (2016, p. 61).

This reality is perhaps confirmed by the results of voting on draft laws, as illustrated in the following table (State Secretariat for Relations with Parliament, 2021, p. 54)

| Draft laws                | The number | Ratio       |
|---------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Unanimously approved      | 251        | 79 percent  |
| Approved by majority vote | 66         | 21 percent  |
| Total                     | 317        | 100 percent |

If we have previously noted the government's dominance over legislative initiative and legislative mechanisms, we now note, in light of these facts, the government's absolute dominance over legislative output, both in terms of quantity and quality. This can be explained by the constraints of parliamentary rationalization, without excluding the importance of subjective factors, as there are those who believe that the opposition's shortcomings and poor performance are attributable to the parliamentarians themselves. This view is evident when examining parliamentary legislative initiatives and the participation of the minority in committee work and plenary sessions, noting that Article 78 of the 2011 Constitution clearly stipulates the right of both the head of government and members of parliament to submit draft laws (Ahmiyane, 2019, p. 18).

However, during the tenth legislative term, all parliamentary groups and blocs in both houses of parliament (majority and opposition) were able to submit 314 legislative proposals, while the government submitted 350, revealing an imbalance between the two institutions.

Among the criticisms leveled at the opposition during the tenth and eleventh legislative terms was that most of its proposals were amendments, some of which aimed to supplement, change or repeal previous legislative provisions in line with the legislative policy of the incumbent government. Thus, during the tenth legislative term, the opposition submitted 66 proposals to amend supplement or repeal a number of previous legislative provisions, representing 63.36 percent of the total, compared to 30 legislative proposals, representing 28.8 percent (Data obtained through the researcher's personal efforts based on the database available on the Ministry of Relations with Parliament website).

Most of these amendments do not affect the content and substance of the government's legal texts. This is confirmed by the report on the outcome of the legislative initiative of the parliamentary blocs (majority and opposition) during the third year of the eleventh legislative term, which noted that most of the proposals submitted by the parliamentary blocs were aimed at amending legal texts, either by changing or supplementing them, which constituted more than 83 percent of the initiatives submitted, while initiatives relating to the creation of new laws did not exceed 10 proposals (Semsime Association- Citizen Participation 2024, p7 ).

The scarcity of opposition proposals is also reflected in the lack of independent legislative proposals that express the legislative awareness of parliamentarians and their views on legislative policy in general, based on their understanding of citizens' needs and the economic, social and cultural conditions of Moroccan society, They are dominated by sectarianism and express the interests of certain social groups, or they affect the personal interests of parliamentarians or a certain elite. This is confirmed by the results of a study which indicates that only 10 percent of respondents expressed the belief that parliamentarians spend most of their time seeking solutions to citizens' problems and their Political, economic and social Demands, while 34% of respondents considered that MPs' concerns are often directed toward serving the private interests of a particular elite or group without regard for the public interest ((Khalis, 2014, p. 192).

Table of proposed laws submitted by parliamentary groups – House of Representatives during the tenth legislative term (Ministry of State for Relations with Parliament, 2021, p. 56)

| <b>Parliamentary groups</b>                                    | <b>Remaining bills under consideration from the Ninth Legislative Term</b> | <b>Proposed laws introduced during the tenth term</b> | <b>Legislative proposals finally approved</b> | <b>Approved bills referred to the other chamber</b> | <b>Proposals Withdrawn laws</b> | <b>Remaining bills under consideration after the conclusion of the tenth legislative term</b> |
|--|--|---|---|---|---------------------------------|---|
| <b>Justice and Development (Majority)</b>                      |  | 61  | 06  |   | 03                              | 52  |
| <b>Constitutional Rally (Majority)</b>                         |  | 09  | 01  | 01  |                                 | 07  |
| <b>The Action Group (Majority)</b>                             |  | 19  |   |   |                                 | 19  |
| <b>Socialist Group (majority)</b>                              |  | 25  | 02  | 01  |                                 | 22  |
| <b>Independent Group for Unity and Neutrality (Opposition)</b> |  | 45  | 01  | 02  |                                 | 42  |
| <b>Authenticity and Modernity Group (Opposition)</b>           |  | 47  | 02  |   | 03                              | 42  |
| <b>Progress and Socialism</b>                                  |  | 23  |   |   |                                 | 23  |

| Group (Opposition)                                 |    |     |     |    |    |     |
|--|----|-----|-----|----|----|-----|
| Joint proposals                                    |    | 26  | 06  |    | 03 | 17  |
| Proposed laws referred by the House of Councillors | 06 | 07  | 02  |    |    | 11  |
| <b>Total</b>                                       | 06 | 269 | 191 | 04 | 09 | 242 |

### Conclusion

The proposals of the parliamentary opposition are remarkably weak, if not virtually non-existent, despite the constitutional legislator's adoption of an affirmative formula for the role of the parliamentary opposition in the legislative sphere. The executive branch has been able to expand its influence and powers through its excessive interference in the legislative sphere, in addition to the government's monopoly on the right of initiative in financial matters in most cases. This confirms the influence of parliamentary rationalization on the Moroccan legislator, which evokes the legacy of the Fifth Republic of 1958, despite the adoption of an affirmative formula for the role of the opposition in the legislative sphere.

The outcome of the tenth legislative term shows a clear dominance of the government in terms of legislative initiative or effective and intensive presence at all stages of the legislative process, due to its constitutional and legal techniques and other elements related to material and technical capabilities, and because of the lack of initiative in parliamentary behavior and the desire to go along with the government rather than rejecting the policy of *fait accompli* and submitting to the prevailing culture among parliamentarians that the government is best placed to take legislative initiative.

While the argument that there are legal and practical constraints is somewhat acceptable, what is unacceptable is the relinquishment by parliamentarians of their role in influencing and directing the legislative process, leading to an imbalance within the legislative institution in favor of the executive branch, with the latter becoming an ordinary legislator with its strong and diverse constitutional mechanisms, while parliament becomes an exceptional legislator.

Faced with the tightening of the noose around the parliamentary minority's legislative initiative, it has no choice but to activate various oversight mechanisms and means to put pressure on the government, including raising the government's political responsibility by submitting an oversight petition.

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